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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect that an intergenerational redistribution policy has on effective
demand by introducing the monetary stagnation model into an overlapping generations
economy. We show that the redistribution from a younger generation to an older generation
worsens effective demand and the employment rate.
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The intergenerational problem cannot be disregarded when considering eco-
nomic policy in recent years.For example, the problem of distribution be-
tween generations is related to policy issues such as the payment of pensions
or the medical burden of an aging population.Attempting to analyze these
problems with a method of analysis that assumes full employment conditions
means that, even if an intergenerational redistribution policy is conducted,
demand is still maintained by a supply level that results in full employment.
Therefore, the supply-side analysis of the neo-classical model cannot analyze
the eﬀects of an intergenerational redistribution policy on unemployment and
eﬀective demand.If the problem of distribution between generations is con-
sidered in a Keynesian monetary economy, we can consider what inﬂuence
an intergenerational redistribution policy has on eﬀective demand.
The present analysis is motivated by two important issues in Japan, ef-
fective demand shortage and public pension scheme.1Therefore, this paper
implements the analysis of social security in an economy under stagnation.To
analyze this problem, we follow Ono (1994, 2001), who introduces a dynamic
stagnation model under perfect foresight and perfect competition.However,
Ono’s representative agent model cannot deal with the problem of distri-
bution.Consequently, in this paper, we apply the characteristics of the
monetary economy developed by Ono (2001) to the overlapping generations
model.This enables us to consider the intergenerational problem in an econ-
omy characterized by unemployment and a shortage of eﬀective demand, and
to analyze how to attain an eﬀective level of demand.
New Keynesian economists, such as Marquardt (1998), Corneo and Mar-
quardt (2000) and others, have examined the eﬀect of intergenerational re-
distribution on economic growth in an economy characterized by unemploy-
ment.However, the existence of unemployment in these studies was pro-
duced from an assumption of ﬁxed wages in an imperfect labor market, such
as a labor union and eﬃcient wages, and the level of eﬀective demand was
not determined endogenously by individual optimization.In these studies,
it was assumed that the eﬀective demand and the unemployment rate were
not aﬀected by the intergenerational redistribution carried out by the social
security system.By contrast, in this paper, intergenerational redistribution
aﬀects the eﬀective demand and the employment rate because these are de-
1See Krugman (1999) for the characterization of stagnation in Japan.
2termined endogenously by individual optimization.
Like Ono (1994), we follow Keynes (1936) and consider an economy with
a sluggish wage adjustment mechanism and an insatiable liquidity preference
agent.Then, money plays a role, not only as a means of storing wealth or as
a means of transaction,2 but also the holding of money itself provides direct
utility through the liquidity preference or status preference.3 When the indi-
vidual liquidity preference is insatiable, the economy falls permanently into a
situation where there is a shortage of eﬀective demand, even if the economy is
perfectly competitive, and involuntary unemployment results.The purpose
of this paper is to investigate the eﬀects of an intergenerational redistribution
policy on eﬀective demand under conditions of economic stagnation.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
The economy begins in period 0, and a cohort born in period t is called
generation t.The population of each generation is normalized to one.The
ﬁrst and second periods of the agents’ lifetimes are referred to as young
and old, respectively.The agents derive utility from consumption and from
holding money when they are young and old.Thus, the utility of agents in

















t+1 denote the real money demand of the young and old, respec-
tively, and δ(∈(0, 1)) is the subjective discount factor. u(·) and v(·) satisfy
the following properties: u (·) >0, u”(·) <0; v (·) >0, v”(·) ≤ 0.We consider
that the household has an insatiable desire for accumulating money;4 i.e.,
2See Blanchard and Fisher (1989) for a discussion of the transaction role of money.
3Fershtman et al. (1996), Corneo and Jeanne (1997) and Futagami and Shibata (1998),
among others, consider a relative asset holding as a social preference. On the other hand,
Zou (1995, 1998), Ono (2001) and Matsuzaki (2003) consider an absolute asset(money)
holding. See Weiss and Fershtman (1998) and Clark and Oswald (1998) for an extensive
survey on the ‘status’ literature.
4Theoretically, this property obtains in Veblen’s framework (1949) where agents care
about status. In particular, if v(mo)is replaced by µ(mo− ¯ mo), where ¯ moimplies the same
generation average of m, µ (mo − ¯ mo) stays to be ﬁxed at µ (0) as m expands since mo
3limm→∞v
 (m)=β>0, (2)
where β is an exogenous and positive constant value.5
Agents are endowed with one unit of labor, which they supply inelastically
when young, and they retire when they are old.The agents transfer a given





t .For clarity of exposition, money is the only asset.Thus, the





t , where Wt, xt, and Pt denote wage income, the employment rate, and
the price index, respectively.Since the population of each generation is
normalized to one, employment rate represents xt = min(1, nt), where nt
is labor demand.This implies that the realized labor supply is determined
on the short side by either the potential labor supply, 1, or by the actual
labor demand, nt, of the ﬁrm.The old agents divide their savings, a given
government transfer Et+1, and bequests Bt+1 between consumption co
t+1 and
money holding Mo
t+1.6 Then, the budget constraints of the old in generation
t are: M
y
t + Et+1 + Bt+1 = Pt+1co
t+1 + Mo
t+1.
Then, the budget constraints valued in real terms are as follows:











where πt(≡ Pt+1/Pt− 1) is the inﬂation rate, and mt (= Mt/Pt), wt (=
Wt/Pt), and dt (= Dt/Pt) are valued in real terms.
Maximizing (1) subject to (3), we obtain:
always equals ¯ mo in the present setting. Thus, let this value β, the following argument
holds. To consider the policy under stagnation, Ono (2001) and Matsuzaki (2003) use an
insatiable preference analogous to our model.
5This property is empirically shown by Ono (1994, Ch3), using the General Method
of Moment (GMM). Recently, Ono et al. (1998) attempt to provide a justiﬁcation for
the existence of an insatiable liquidity preference by testing for it empirically in Japan,
using two data sets (Nikkei Radar data), based on prefectures and individuals. In their
empirical investigation, they use two diﬀerent econometric methods, a parametric and a
nonparametric method. They show that an insatiable liquidity preference is signiﬁcantly
positive at standard signiﬁcance levels.
6In this paper, since households have a liquidity preference, the older generation holds
money. The property left behind after the older generation has died is transferred to the
























where (4) represents Keynes’s rule.The left hand side of the equation rep-
resents the time preference rate, which is the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption by the young and consumption by the old.The right
hand side represents the liquidity premium, which is the marginal rate of
substitution between present consumption and present money holdings.
2.2 Firms
The production function is assumed to satisfy constant returns to scale:
yt = θnt, where yt represents output.The productivity, θ, is assumed to
be constant.Since, in this case, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are nt(Ptθ − Wt), the real
wage rate is given by: Wt/Pt = wt = θ in a competitive market.
3 Market Adjustments
Social security can be operated as a pay-as-you-go system, which transfers
current contributions made by the young directly to the current old gener-
ation, so that: dt = et.Moreover, an inheritance is an asset that a for-
mer generation’s old agents have left to the current generation.Therefore,
bt+1 = mo
t/(1 + πt).





t = ¯ M

Pt, (6)
where ¯ M represents the total money supply.





t = θxt (7)
Then, from (3) and (7), we ﬁnd that m
y
t = co
t − et holds in equilibrium.
In contrast, the nominal wage takes time to adjust.Hence, we assume a
sluggish nominal-wage adjustment in the labor market.As in Ploeg (1993)




= α(xt − 1), (8)
where α represents the speed of the nominal wage adjustment.
Since the real wage is constant, P moves in parallel to W.Thus, (7) and
























4 Stagnation Steady State Conditions and the
Eﬀects of Social Security
For expositional purposes, we deﬁne the utility function of households as:
u(c)=l nc, v(m)=l nm + βm.
4.1 Stagnation steady state conditions
In this section, we present the steady state conditions required to be in
stagnation.In the stagnation steady state, cy and co remain constant.Since
x< 1 in this state and P continues to decline,8 the proportion of old agents
holding money increases.9 Then, from (5), the old generation’s consumption
increases.However, under the insatiable liquidity preference equation (2),
the marginal liquidity preference approaches its lower bound as P declines.
Eventually, the steady state consumption of the old agents becomes:
c
o =1 /β. (10)
From (3), (7) and (10), the proportion of young agents holding money is
my =1 /β −e in market equilibrium.Then, the consumption of the young is
7See Roberts (1995) for discussion on various models of such sluggishness price/wage
adjustment, called new Keynesian Phillips curve.
8See Appendix B for the dynamic stability.
9See Appendix A for the dynamics of money holding.
6obtained from (9).Now, by deﬁning the π-curve as the time preference rate
and the  -curve as the liquidity premium of money, (9) can be expressed as
the following two equations:
π − curve : F(c
y)=1−
δβcy
1+α[(cy +1 /β)/θ − 1]
, (11)









where we assume parameter condition e< 1/β.Consider the following con-
dition:
α<θ /(θ − 1/β) (13)
we assume that this parameter condition holds, then π-curve is decreasing
in cy.10 These curves are illustrated in Fig.1.The interaction point of
the two curves represents the consumption of the young in a steady state.
Since θ is the full employment production level (x=1), full employment is
attained when the consumption level of the young equals Y (≡ θ−1/β > 0).
Therefore, from (11) and (12), the stagnation steady state exists if:11
[1/(1/β − e)+β]Y> 1 − δβY. (14)
Equation (14) shows that if β or θ is high, then the economy falls into
persistent stagnation.12
4.2 The eﬀects of social security
In this section, the eﬀects of an intergenerational redistribution policy on
eﬀective demand under stagnation are investigated.
Now, the eﬀect of the social security policy on eﬀective demand can be
explained using a π-curve and  -curve of Fig.1.The π-curve is not inﬂu-
10This condition is also needed for ensuring the dynamic stability condition proved in
Appendix B.
11From (11) and (12), F(cy) is monotonically decreasing and G(cy) is monotonically
increasing. Since F(0) >G(0) and F(Y) <G(Y ) holds under (14), the interaction point
lies in the range of (0, Y ) and is unique.
12A full employment steady state such as that in a neo-classical economy requires that
[1/(1/β − e)+β]Y< 1 − δβY.
7enced by a change to a social security policy e at all, as is clearly shown in
equation (11).However, as e is contained in the  -curve of equation (12), it
is inﬂuenced by the social security policy.Therefore, in order to investigate
the eﬀect of a social security policy on eﬀective demand, it is necessary to
determine in which direction the  -curve of Fig.1 shifts because of a change
of e.Diﬀerentiating equations (12) from e in order to investigate the shift,





2 > 0. (15)
It is shown that the  -curve surely shifts up by the social security policy.
Fig.2 shows that the shift to the upper part of the  -curve decreases the ef-
fective demand to cy∗∗ from cy∗.This can be explained intuitively as follows.
The reduction in the younger generation’s money holdings leads to a rise in
the liquidity premium, i.e., a shift to the upper part of the  -curve.To fulﬁll
Keynes’s rule in stagnation, the level of consumption must be decreased and
the consumption rate of time preference, the π-curve, must shift upwards.
Therefore, since a rise in the social security costs will reduce the younger
generation’s money holdings, the liquidity preference increases, with the ef-
fect that consumption is cut back.Moreover, the older generation’s liquidity
premium reaches a lower bound in the steady state because the social secu-
rity beneﬁts increase the older agents’ income, and this extra income goes
towards holding money rather than towards consumption.Moreover, from
equation (7), it is shown that the reduction in the eﬀective demand worsens
the rate of employment.
5 Conclusion
This paper has used a stagnation model to examine the impact of inter-
generational transfer on eﬀective demand and the employment rate.In this
model, the older generation does not increase consumption because of their
insatiable desire for accumulating money, whereas the younger generation
cannot consume because they are poor.Consequently, persistent stagnation
arises.We found that, although a policy that redistributes income from the
younger generation to the older generation, such as social security policy,
decreases the consumption by the young, the consumption by the old is not
changed.Thus, such a policy worsens the eﬀective demand and, as a result,
increases the unemployment rate.
8A The dynamics of money holdings
From (3) and (7), m
y
t = co
t − et holds in equilibrium.Substituting this and














t/dPt < 0 holds.Thus, the older generations’ holdings of
money continue to increase under the persistent deﬂation in the stagnation





t+β − e in equilibrium, the steady state value becomes
my =1 /β − e.
B Stability analysis
In this appendix we examine the conditions for stability.We set the transfer
e to 0 for simplicity.From (3), (5) and (7), the younger generations’ holding
of money is co
t in equilibrium.In addition, the older generation’s holding of
money is mo
















 (φ(Pt+1)) = 0. (17)
Thus, the younger generation’s consumption is written as c
y
t = cy(Pt,P t+1)
from (17).On the other hand, since from (5), the older generation’s con-
sumption is c0










Now, to check the local stability, we evaluate the deliverance of (18)










(19) is satisﬁed as 0 <d P t+1/dPt < 1 under (13) and (14).Thus, the local
stability conditions are suﬃcient for the economy to be stable.
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Figure 2: The Eﬀect of Social Security Policy
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